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the power to remove the master, whether he be part owner or not,
and to resume possession of her at their own pleasure.
2. That in the case of a part owner only a written agreement,
entitling such part owner to possession, can defeat the exercise of

such right.
3. That the contract set up here is not susceptible of specific
enforcement, either by way of estoppel or by a direct proceeding
for that purpose, and hence is no defence against the libel.
4. That the only remedy of the respondent for a breach of such
contract, if he has any, is an action for damages.
There must, therefore, be a decree for the libellants.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUI
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.3
SUPREME COURT OF IOWA.'
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.6
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 6
ADMIRALTY.

Collision-Suits in Personam-Jurisdictionnot Exclusive.-The
jurisdiction of courts of admiralty over suits in personam for damages
by collision is not exclusive, but there is also a remedy at common law:
Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
ATTACHMENT.
Removal from State.-The statute authorizing an attachment on the

ground that the defendant is about to remove his property out of the
state, without leaving sufficient to pay his debts, contemplates a permanent removal and not a temporary use of property by the owner out of
the state: Warder v. YYrilkeld, 52 Iowa.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1880. The cases will probably be reported in 12 Otto.
2 From John Hooker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 47 Conn. Reports.
3 From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 96 Illinois Reports
'

From Hon. John S. Runnells, Reporter; to appear in 52 Iowa Reports.

9 From G. D. IV. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 13 of his Reports

0 From A. Wilson Norris, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 90 Penn. St. Reports.
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BiLLS AND NOTES. See Usury.
Draft-Payableon Demand-Grace.-Adraft in which no time foz
payable on demand, and is not entitled to
payment is nientioned i's
grace. This rule of the law merchant is not changed by chapter 81,
laws of 1876: First National Bank v. Price, 52 Iowa.
The fact that. such a draft calls for interest after maturity does not
indicate that it is not payable on demand: Id.
BILL OF ExcEpmoNs.

Sgning after time limited by Rule of Court-Previous suing out of
Writ of Error-Dating upon day subsequent to Trial,-A rule of
court requiring the presentation of a bill of exceptions for signature
within five days after the trial, is not binding upon the judge, but he
may sign the bill at any time during the term: Hunnicut v. Peyton,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
The suing- out of a writ of error before the signature of the judge
is obtained to the bill of exceptions, is not a waiver of the exceptions:
.d.
A bill of exceptions is not invalid because it is dated and filed as of
a date subsequent to the trial during ?he same term, and not as of the
day of trial: Id.
CANAL.

Liability of Company for Injury from Unknown' Obstruction.-A
canal company is neither a common carrier nor an insurer, nor liable as
such. As owner and operator of a public water highway, it is bound to
so maintain and manage the canal, that it can 'be used with reasonable
safety and convenience by the public, but it is not liable for an injury
resulting from an unknown obstruction, which could not have been
guarded against without the exercise of extraordinary and unreasonable
care: The Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Burd, 90 Penn. St.
COLLISION.

See .Admiralty.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Fishery.
Criminal Law-Repeal of Statute of Limitations-Ex post facto
Laws.-A statute which repeals, an act limiting the time within which
crimes shall be proscribed, is not an expostfacto law, within the meaning of the federal or state constitution: State v. "Moore, 13 Vroom.
A person committed 'certain crimes at a time more than two years
antecedent tothe finding of an indictment, and at a time When the law
barred the prosecution for such criines by the lapse of two years; after
two years had run and the prosecution was thus barred, the legislature
repealed the Act of Limitation, and extended the time three years
beyond the original limit. 'Held, such repeal and extdnsion were
valid : Id.
Regulation of 'Commere- Taxation-Discriminationagainst Imports
from othei States- Unconstitutionalityof Portion of Stqtute-Enforcement of Remainder.-A state statute which imposes a, tax for selling
spiritous, vinous, malt and other intoxicating liquors, with a proviso that
it shall aot apply to wine or beer manufactured in the state, is unconstitutional, so far as it makes a discrimination against wine and beer im.
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ported from other states, but payment of the tax cannot be avoided on
this ground by one who in addition to such wine and beer sells other
intoxicating liquors within the terms of the statute : liernanv. Rinker,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
CONTRACT.

See Insurance.

CORPORATION.

Insolvent-Preference to Creditor-Dealing with Stockholder or
Director as a Greditor.-A corporation transferred a quantity of its
goods to two of its directors, to be sold by them and the proceeds
applied in payment of a joint claim of large amount which they had
against it. The corporation was in fact insolvent, but it was supposed
by the parties at the time that it was able to pay all its debts. The
transaction was in good faith and with no intention to defraud creditors.
Held, that there was no principle of law that rendered the transaction
fraudulent: Smith v. iSkeary, 47 Conn.
The obtaining a preference by one creditor of an insolvent debtor
over another is not fraudulent at common law: Md.
The two directors held. for another debt of the corporation, a mortgage of its warehouse, within wiich the goods were stored. The condition of the mortgage having been broken, the corporation delivered
to them the goods as they were, and they at once, with consent of the
corporation, took open possession of the warehouse under their mortgage and retained exclusive possession of the same and of the goods,
selling portions of the latter as they had opportunity. Held, that there
was a sufficient delivery: Id.
If a stockholder or director of a corporation deals with it in his
individual capacity the law will protect him as well as any other party.
His relation to the corporation only goes to the question of the good
faith of the transaction : Id.
CRIM INAL LAW. See ConstitutionalLaw.
for Penalty.-In a summary proceeding for a
Proceedings
Summary
penalty, an exception in the statute, though not in the enacting clause,
must be shown to be inapplicable in the case by proper averments:
Doughty v. Conover, 13 Vroom.
The conviction must coutain sufficient of the evidence to show the
legal propriety of the judgment founded upon it; Id.
Murder-Burden of Proof-Degree of Proof required to establish
Defence on a Criminal Prosecution.-Wherethe killing is proved on a
trial for murder, the burden of proving circumstances in mitigation, or
that justify or excuse the homicide, is thrown upon the accused, unless
the proof on the part of the prosecution sufficiently manifests the same
facts, and an instruction which imposes the burden of proving such facts
upon the defence, without reference to whether they appear from the
proof by the prosecution, is erroneous, as casting upon the defendant a
greater burden than the law requires: Alexander v. The People, 96 Ills.
When the killing is proved, on a charge of murder, and the defendant
3eeks to show he was justified or excused, it is erroneous to instruct the
jury that it is incumbent on him to establish satisfactorily such defence.
The statute does not require-such a high degree of proof. The defend
VOL. XXIX.-IO
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ant is only bound to prove the circumstances of mitigation, or that
justify or excuse, as any other fact is to be proved. If the proof
creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal: 1d.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Corporation.
DEED.

See Eguity.

Courses and Distances-Evidencein Ambiguous Caes.-Where land
is described in a deed of conveyance by courses and distances dnd also
by calls for adjoiners, the latter, where there is a discrepancy and there
are no monuments on the land must govern: Koch v. Dunkel, 90 Penn.
St
If there is any ambiguity in a deed as to the quantity of land conveyed thereby, arising from a conflict between the calls or the courses
and distances, articles of agreement in pursuance of which the deed
may be admitted in evidence, to show the intent of the
was executed
parties ; Id.
DELIVERY. See
Corporation.
DOWER.
Action to Recover--Statute of Limitations - Improvements.- The
Statute of Limitations does not commence to run against an action to
recover a dower interest in lands until there is an adverse possession by
the heirs or grantees of the husband : Felch v. F'nch, 52 Iowa.
In an action to recover dower in land conveyed by the plaintiff's husband, who died in 1862, where it appeared that his grantees purchased
in good faith and without knowledge that he was married at the time
of the conveyance, it was held that plaintiff was entitled to a life estate
in one-third in value of the land, witb6ut improvements, and that money
paid to secure the location of a depot on the land, and in surveying and
platting in into town lots, was a legitimate expenditure for its improvement, and the enhancement in value by reason thereof should be considered as improvements in apportioning the plaintiff's interest : Id.
The widow is under no obligation to pay any portion of the taxes levied
on the lands of her deceased husband before her dower has assigned; Id.
DRAFT. See Bills and Notes.
EQUITY.

Relief against J.udgment.-A bill in chancery to set aside a judgment at law alleged that the complainant took no part at the trial,
because his attorney of record was at that time engaged in professional
business at another court, and that the attorney for the plaintiff in the
suit at law fraudulently presented but a part of the record upon which
the judgment was recovered. The charge of fraud was general, and
the alleged defect in presentation of the record was not shown to have
done any wrong to the complainant. Held, that the bill failed to show
any equitabie grounds for relief: Dinet v. Eigenmann, 96 Ill.
Reforming a Deed- Waste-Right to dig Ore.-The proper construction of a deed is not a subject of equity jurisdiction, and where
there is neither averment or proof of fraud, accident or mistake, a court
of equity cannot reform a deed: GCrubb's Appeal, 90 Penn. St.
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A person who is not a tenant in possession, but possesses a right to
dig ore, is not guilty of committing a waste or trespass when he takes
out more ore than his contract or his right calls ibr, and a court of
equity cannot restrain him by injunction : Id.
Nor will a court of equity in such a case decree an account where the
account is a mere matter of charge for a certain number of tons of ore,
with no entries on the other side of the account. This is clearly the
subject of an action of assumpsit at law . Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Bill of Exceptions.
ESTREPEMENT.

See Malicious Prosecution.

EVIDENCE.
Private Boundaries-DeclarationofPersons Deceased at time of Trial
When not admissible.-In questions of private boundary, declarations
of particular facts, as distinguished from reputation, made by deceased
persons, are not admissible unless they were made by persons shown to
have had knowledge of that whereof they spoke, or by persons on the
land or in possession of it, and who made the declarations while pointing out or marking the boundaries, or discharging some duties relating
thereto : Hunnicut v. Peyton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
EXECUTOR.
De son Tort.-A man died, leaving no property but his wearing
apparel. His widow paid, out of her own means, the expenses of his
last sickness and of his burial, and gave to his brother a suit of
his clothes, of less value than the amount thus paid out by her. Held,
that she had not made herself liable to a creditor of her husband as
executrix in her own wrong: Taiylor v. Moore, 47 Conn.
FISHERY.
Right ,f State to Regulate.-The state has the right, by legislation,
to protect fish in rivers and streams not navigable : Weller et al., Prosecutors, v. Snover, 13 Vroom.
Regulation of-aking
use of Nets Penal.-A statute regulating the
fisheries throughout the state, is not unconstitutional with respect to
a provision making penal the use of nets at certain times in particular
counties: Doughty v. Conover, 13 Vroom
FRAUD.

See Corporation; Sale.

Fraudulent Conveyance by Wife to lHusband.-Where the only
proof that a conveyance was fraudulent, was the fact that it was made
by an indebted wife to her husband, and they both testified that the
conveyance was executed in consideration that the husband undertook
to pay certain specified debts of the wife, which was not a grossly'inadequate price for the property, and that he had since paid the same,
the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors being expressly denied,
and it appeared that the debt under which the conveyance was assailed
was incurred by the wife as surety, and bouh she and her husband
denied any knowledge of the existence of such debt when the deed
was made, supposing it was paid, or otherwise secured, it was held there
was not sufficient proof of fraud to defeat the husband's equitable title:
Tyberandt v. Raucke, 96 Ills.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Dower; Fraud.

Contractof Married Women.-The statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 19, ch.
c
5, sect. 9,) provides that "a tions may be maintained against a married
woman upon any contract made by her since her marriage upon her
personal credit, for the benefit of herself, her family, or her separate or
Held, that her contract to convey her land does not come
joint estate."
within this statute: Gore v. Carl and Wife, 47 Conn.
Such a contract was executed by both husband and wife. Held not
enforceable in equity against both jointly, nor against the husband
alone: Id.
Payments made to the husband upon such a contract, without the
consent of the wife, can not affect her rights: Id.
Husband may Confess Judgment to Wife.-A husband may confess
-or suffer a judgment to be entered against himself in favor of his wife,
without the intervention of a trustee, and execution may be lawfully
issued thereon: Rose and Wife v. Latshaw et al., 90 Penn. St.
INSURANCE.
Violation of conditions of Policy-Pleading.-Wherethe replication
in a suit on a policy of insurance in reply to a plea that subsequent
insurances had been taken out in violation of a condition, sets up notice
of such subsequent policies, it is not necessary for the defendant to
prove at the trial, the taking out of such policies, their existence being
admitted by the issue : Warbasse v. Essex County Mut. Ins. Co., 13
Vroom.
A policy issued to the owner of a building, in which the money is
agreed to be paid, in case of loss, to a designated person, is a contract
with such owner, and is liable to be defeated by the violation of any
of its conditions by such owner: Id.
Undelivered Policy-No Liability upon.-An insurance company
receiving an application through their agent and forwarding to the
agent a policy conditioned not to take effect until payment of the premium, is not liable upon the death of the assured before the receipt of
the policy and payment of the premium: Giddings v. Northwestern
tut. Life Ins. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1880.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Neglgene-Contributory.-In an action to recover for injury caused
by defendant to the estate of plaintiff's decedent by selling liquors to
said decedent until he became intoxicated and unconscious, and then
expelling him from a saloon at a late hour of the night, thereby causing
his death from exposure, it was held erroneous to instruct the jury that
the purchasing and drinking of the liquor by the deceased constituted
contributory negligence, which would bar a recovery: Weymire v. Wolfe,
52 Iowa.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

See Constitutional Law; Dower.

Possession by .truder-Extent of Constructive Possession-Re-entry
by Owner on Portion of Land-Effect of.-Though actual possession
of a part of a tract, by one claiming the whole under a junior title,
gives to such claimant constructive possession of the whole tract, yet
the subsequent entry of the true owner upon any part of the land, will
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stop the running of the Statute of Limitations in favor of the holder
of tile junior title, except as to the portion in the latter's actual possession: Ilunnicut v. Peyton, S. C. U. S., Oct. Terui 1880.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Abo.e of Civil P"oce-s-Estrepernent.-Althbough legal process may,
by it, malicious use, give rise to a cause of action, yet in such a case
there mtust not only be a malicious use but there must be no reasonable
or probable cause for such process, since if there be such cause, the
intention goes for nothing: ATI',rl, v. Rupp. 90 Penn. St.
As a writ of estrepenient is purely preventive, and neither arrests the
per-on nor seizes the goods of a defendant, the use of such process cannot be the foundation of an action: Id.
IORTGAGE.
Equitable Mortgage-Delhvery of Contract for Deed.-The delivery
of a contract for the purchat-e of land by the purchaser to one to
indemnify him against loss by becoming a guarantor for the purchaser,
without any written assignment thereof, constitutes an equitable mortgage, and a subsequent written assignment to another party by mistake
who has no interest in the same, is simply inoperative, where no word
of conveyance are used. Even an endorsement of the contract to the
guarantor alter the delivery will not change the character of the transaction: Allen v. Woodruff. 96 Ills.
A written assignment of a deed or contract for the conveyance of
land is not necessary to the creation of an equitable mortgage, and the
only possible effect of such written assignment is, that when the instrument and assignment have been recorded, it will afford constructive
notice of the mortgagee's rights, and also as evidence of the fact of the
assignment in case of a dispute: .d.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

Reg i iton of Trade,-License-PolcePower- Taxation.-Powerin
a municipal corporation to regulate and license a business or trade, confers no power to impose a tax upon such business or trade: State, .3uh.
lenbrink, Pros., v. Long Branch Commissioners, 13 Vroom.
The rules and regulations which a corporation may make in respect to
business or trade, under its police power, are such only as have relation
to the public health, morals, and order of the community: Ld.
A municipal corporation having power to regulate and license peddling, &c., passed an ordinance that no pedlar should drive a cart, &c.,
without a license, and for every license there should be paid, &e. Held,
to be a tax for revenue, and beyond the powers of the corporation: Id.
NATIONAL BANK.
NEGLIGENCE.

See

sury.

See Intoxicating Liquors.

Contributory Neqligence of Plaintiff.-The plaintiffs nwne.1 a tollbridge, under a charter which provided that they should :=ai::t-_in in
good repair a suitable draw at some convenient place -ufficiete t.. admit
the free and easy passage of vessels. The defendants' s.;,'i :r , zs.n
through, was, by their negligence, allowed to run against and knock ot
the corner of one of the piers supporting the bridgi.
Held, in a suit
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by the bridge company for the damage, that the plaintifrE wers not to b.
regarded as contributing to the injury by reason of the fact: rhich was
found, that if the pier had been protected by piles the dan.ge would
have been lessened or prevented: Toll-bridge Co. v. Langre.l, 47 Conn.
The plaintifE3 were bound only to use ordinary care in protecting the
pier, and a finding that piles would have prevented the injury could not
be regarded as equivalent to a finding that ordinary care required the
plaintiffs to maintain them: Id.
Contributory and Comparative-Railroad-Dutyof Persons Crossin.-In an action to recover damages resulting from the alleged negligeuce of the defendant, if it appears that the plaintiff has been guilty
of negligence, no recovery can be had unless his negligence was slight,
when compared with that of defendant, which was gross: Chicago &
Northwestern Railway Co. v. Dimick, 96 Ills.
Where both parties have been guilty of negligence, a mere preponderance in degree will not render the defendant liable. So it was held
an instruction did not lay down the correct rule, which declared that
although the plaintiff, by his own negligence, may have in some degree
contributed to the injury, yet if the negligence of the defendant was
of a higher degree, or so much greater than that of the plaintiff that
the negligence of the latter was slight in comparison, the plaintiff might
recover: Id.
It is the duty of a person approaching a railroad crossing upon a
highway to look and listen for a train on the railroad, and it is negligence to omit that duty: Id.
See Criminal Law; Insurance.
Duplicity- Title in Plaintiff.-It is not duplicity to allege in a single
count various kinds of damage resulting from a single wrongful act:
Wolfe v. Beecher .Manufacturing Co., 47 Conn.
Where a declaration alleged an injury caused by a nuisance maintained by the defendants, both to a house owned and occupied by him,
and to himself personally and to his family in the use of the house, and
it appeared that during the time the title to the property had been in
another party and only the possession in the plaintiff, it was held, that
he could not recover for the injury to the freehold: Id.
The property had been owned by the plaintiff, and he had conveyed
it to a third person without consideration, for the purpose of evading
an attachment. Held, that the plaintiff had no title that the law would
recognise even as an equitable one: Id.
But an equitable title would not have been sufficient to enable him
to recover in his own name for injuries to the freehold: Id.
After the plaintiff had put in his evidence as to the nuisance and its
effects, the defendants offered evidence that the plaintiff was not the
owner of the freehold. To meet this, the plaintiff offered evidence of
his actual occupation during all the time that the title was in the third
person, of his letting a part of the house, and of his paying the taxes
upon the property and doing other acts of ownership. To this evidence
the defendants objected, but the court admitted it. Held, that the
ruling of the court could not be sustained, on the ground that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of showing possession on the part
of the plaintiff, and an injury to his nossession, it having clearly been
PLEADING.
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offered by him in support of his claim to recover as owner, especially as
the' court did not explain to the jury that they were not to give any
damages for injury to the freehold: .d.
And held, that such an explanation ought, in the circumstances, to
have been made by the court to the jury, although the counsel for the
plaintiff had stated to the court and jury that he did not claim any
damages for the injury to the freehold : Id.
POSSESSION. See Limitations, Statute of.
RAILROAD.

See Neyligence.

SALE.
Fraudulent Representations by Vendor.-Fraudulent representations

by a vendor may be as well by acts or artifices calculated to deceive,
as by positive assertions: Croyle v. Jlfoses, 90 Penn. St.
Where upon the sale of a horse the vendor knew him to be
unsound in a certain respect, and by artifice concealed the defect, or in
answer to inquiries gave -evasive and artful replies, with intent to
deceive the vendee, and did thereby deceive him to his injury, it was
such a fraud on the vendee as would justify him in rescinding the
contract: Id.
SPEOIFIC PERFORMANCE.

By Assiynee for Securty-Payment- Waiver of Forfeiture.-If the
purchaser of land cannot maintain a bill for the specific performance
of the contract of purchase, his assignee taking the contract as an
indemnity against loss as a guarantor cannot maintain a bill to enforce
the same for his benefit: Allen et al. v. Woodrqff et al., 96 Ill.
Every case in which a specific performance of a contract is sought,
depends largely upon its own circumstances, and a decree of specific
performance is, to a large extent, a matter of discretion. But this discretion is not an arbitrary one, but a legal discretion, to be exercised in
conformity with certain fixed and well recognised principles which
govern courts of equity: Id.
Where a vendor of land, long after the payments mature, accepts
payments, this will be a waiver of his right at that time to declare a
forfeiture for want of prompt payment, and if he afterwards accounts
with the purchaser as to the balance due, and stands by and allows the
purchaser to pay all the taxes and make expensive improvements upon
the land, a tender to him of the sum due by either the purchaser or his
assignee at any time before a forfeiture is declared will be good, and the
contract may be specifically enforced, notwithstanding time is made of
the essence of the contract and there has been a considerable delay in
offering to pay: Rd.
TAX AND TAXATION. See Constitutional Law; Dower; Municipal
Corporation.
UNITED STATES COURTS.

See Admiralty.

USURY.

National Banks-Promissory .Note-Renewal.-Where a national
bank loans money upon a usurious contract, only such penalties can be
enforced as are provided in the National Banking Act. Without regard
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to the question whether or not the state courts would have jurisdiction
of an original action to enforce those penalties, when the bank sues
upon such contract in a state court, the defendant has the right to
maintain the plea of usury as a defence in the same court: National
Bank of Winterset v. Eyre et al., 52 Iowa.
A note given in renewal of one which is usurious, and covering the
usurious interest, is itself affected with usury although bearing but
the legal rate of interest, and it cannot be purged of such usury by
having the amount credited thereon as a payment, without the concurrence of the maker: Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
WAivF.

See Specific Performance.

See Specific Peaformance.
WASTE.

See Equity.

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

See Fisleiy.

.Artificial Channel for Watercourse-Liabilityof Person Constructing such Channel for Injury by Overflow-Acts of other Parties contributing to the Result.-The defendant had constructed a covered
channel for a small brook that ran through his premises in the city of
N. This channel proved insufficient for the flow of all the water that
came down the brook in times of hiavy rain, and by its obstruction
caused the water to overflow upon and injure the adjoining premises of
the plaintiff. The city, since the defendant's channel was made, had
constructed several sewers and drains which emptied into the brook
above his premises, by which a considerable quantity of sewage, and
of surface water that, it was claimed, would have gone in other directions, was let into the brook. In a suit for the damage to the plaintiff's
property, it was held:
1. That the defendant was not liable for any damage beyond that
caused by the natural flow of the water: including its increased flow
from heavy rains and other ordinary natural causes.
2. That it was no reason for holding the defendant liable for more
than this, that the proportion of the damage done by the overflow of
the natural water of the brook was difficult of ascertainment.
3. That the defendant and the city could not be regarded as joint
tort-feasors: Sellick v. Hall, 47 Conn.
The defendant claimed that the city had, before the injury, by legal
proceedings taken the entire brook for a public sewer, and that the
channel within his own premises had, under those proceedings, passed
out of his control and into that of the city. The plaintiff claimed that
the proceedings were not regular and complete, and had not vested a
legal right to the sewer in the sewer in the city. Held, that the question was, whether the city had, in fact, taken possession and control of
the channel for a sewer, the defendant being liable for the continuance
of the nuisance without reference to the legal proceedings, so long as
the actual possession and control had not passed from him to the city:
Td

